Recent polling highlights a defining paradox of the current British political moment. In Ipsos’s Headline Voting Intention, November 2025, Reform UK leads national vote share on 33 per cent, roughly 25 points ahead of Labour. Yet in the same month’s Satisfaction with Leaders and the Government polling, dissatisfaction with Reform’s leader ranks among the highest recorded. High electoral support combined with deep leadership distrust reveals a volatile electorate driven more by rejection of the political status quo than by confidence in an alternative governing project.

This paradox reflects an important shift in voter behaviour. Historically, parties such as UKIP functioned as temporary outlets for Conservative dissatisfaction, with voters often returning to the Conservatives once elections approached and governing choices narrowed. Current polling suggests this dynamic has reversed. Rather than Reform bleeding support back to the Conservatives, it is now Conservative voters who are defecting to Reform. This indicates not a fleeting protest surge but a deeper erosion of Conservative credibility as a governing party.

This shift is best understood through dealignment rather than ideology. Conservative voters have not moved to Reform because they trust its leadership or policy coherence. Instead, they appear to have disengaged from the Conservatives as a competent vehicle for managing the economy, housing, and public services. Years of political instability and declining living standards have weakened the Conservatives’ reputation for competence. When governing credibility collapses, voters become willing to defect even to parties they view sceptically.

Leadership dissatisfaction therefore has not constrained Reform’s polling performance because dissatisfaction has become systemic. Ipsos’s November 2025 data show low satisfaction levels across party leaders and government institutions more broadly. In this environment, leadership approval loses its traditional role as a filter. Voters increasingly prioritise expressing frustration over endorsing a trusted leader. Reform benefits from being outside government and outside the established Labour Conservative cycle, even while its leader remains unpopular.

Importantly, this does not mean the electorate has radicalised in line with Reform’s rhetoric. Polling and voter research suggest that support for Reform is driven by a combination of cultural grievance and economic insecurity, with issues such as migration frequently interpreted through their perceived impact on living standards, housing, and public services. Reform’s appeal lies less in ideological extremism than in its willingness to articulate decline at a time when mainstream parties are perceived to minimise it.

This dynamic creates space for alternative challengers. The Green Party occupies a notably different position in Ipsos polling. While its overall vote share remains lower, leadership dissatisfaction is comparatively low, and a substantial proportion of respondents select “don’t know” when asked to evaluate Green leadership. In a fragmented political system, uncertainty is electorally softer than rejection. Combined with a gradually expanding support base, this positions the Greens as a potential beneficiary of continued volatility, particularly if dissatisfaction with both Labour and Reform hardens.

Reform’s relative strength lies primarily in valence politics rather than ideological positioning. Its migration narrative is consistently linked to housing shortages, pressure on public services, and declining wages. These are competence-based evaluations. When parties converge programmatically, voters prioritise who they believe understands and can manage problems rather than who best represents a traditional ideological position. Reform has been effective at owning the diagnosis of decline, even if voters remain unconvinced by its capacity to govern.

These developments reflect broader structural changes in British politics. The traditional left right divide has weakened, and electoral behaviour increasingly resembles that of a multiparty system, even as institutional structures remain two-party dominated. Labour and the Conservatives are no longer as strongly underpinned by their historical ideologies, although those philosophical roots still shape voter perceptions. Long-standing reputation and experience now function as double-edged swords, signalling competence to some voters while tying parties to past failures for others.

This helps explain why the Liberal Democrats continue to struggle to translate vote share into broad electoral breakthroughs. Their support is often squeezed by tactical voting under first past the post, with voters reverting to Labour or the Conservatives in marginal seats. Reform and the Greens, by contrast, have benefited from political volatility by offering clearer points of distinction, even if those distinctions do not yet amount to governing credibility.

The unresolved question is whether any challenger can convert dissatisfaction into durable trust. Reform’s coalition is currently broad but fragile, built on rejection rather than confidence. The Greens’ appeal is softer but potentially more expandable. Until a party or leader can convincingly signal credible change, British politics is likely to remain characterised by high vote shares, high dissatisfaction, and persistent instability rather than ideological realignment.