open polity

Author: L Shiels

  • Opinion: Do Andrew Tate Supporters Pose a Threat to Society ?

    Opinion: Do Andrew Tate Supporters Pose a Threat to Society ?

    Data from YouGov in 2023, on male opinions of Andrew Tate by age group, shows that while the majority remain unfavourable, increased awareness is associated with a higher likelihood of favourable views, even as overall unfavourability remains largely unchanged. Greater exposure to social media increases the likelihood of encountering harmful content, particularly for younger users who spend more time in digital spaces and have fewer cognitive and social safeguards against it. Australia’s decision to ban under-16s from social media therefore comes at a salient moment. It reflects growing impatience with platforms that continue to roll out new features, such as X’s Grok, while regulatory frameworks struggle to keep pace.

    Furthermore, a growing body of research links high levels of screen time in children to poorer outcomes in language development, attention, memory, and problem-solving. These concerns are increasingly reflected in clinical practice. The Academy of Medical Royal Colleges (AoMRC), which represents 23 medical royal colleges and faculties, has reported repeated testimony from frontline clinicians encountering severe harms associated with technology use across primary, secondary, and community healthcare settings. Doctors have described rising cases involving impaired concentration, reduced attention spans, and cognitive difficulties observed across multiple medical specialties. In response to the scale and consistency of these cases, the AoMRC has begun formally gathering evidence on the recurring cognitive and psychological impacts that may be attributed to prolonged exposure to digital platforms and devices.

    Therefore, the case for meaningful change to laws on social media no longer rests on the behaviour of a marginal group or a handful of extreme personalities. It is increasingly grounded in concern about how digital environments shape cognition, attention, and susceptibility to simplified narratives at scale. When platforms reward repetition, emotional intensity, and binary thinking, they do more than contain harmful ideas. They create the conditions under which those ideas can move beyond private digital echo chambers and begin to cohere into movements, campaigns, and political identities.

    So, when do these views break out of personal digital echo chambers and into movements and campaigns?

    The link between Andrew Tate’s appeal and wider political dynamics becomes clearer when placed in the context of research on populism and sexism. Recent work by Marcos-Marne, Inguanzo, and de Zuñiga (2024) demonstrates that sexist attitudes are not merely adjacent to populist views but are positively correlated with them, even in cases where populism is otherwise weak. This suggests that misogyny is not simply tolerated within right-wing populism, but is integral to the psychological and ideological worldview it promotes. 

    Tate’s worldview closely mirrors the core components of right-wing populism. Populism is defined by 

    1. People-centrism, which draws a sharp boundary between a morally pure “people” and corrupt or illegitimate outsiders; 
    2. Anti-elitism, which frames institutions, experts, and cultural authorities as immoral or hostile; 
    3. A Manichean logic that reduces politics to a struggle between good and evil. 

    In its exclusionary forms, populism often fuses anti-immigration sentiment with rigid gender hierarchies, positioning feminism and gender equality as threats to social order rather than advances in justice. Tate’s rhetoric follows this template almost perfectly, casting men as victims of a corrupt elite order and women as both prizes and problems within that system.

    Crucially, this ideological package thrives on simplicity. Research from Erisen et al. show that people’s “need for cognition” differs and thus helps explain why such messages resonate unevenly. 

    Individuals with a low need for cognition tend to prefer simple explanations and clear moral narratives over complex, multi-causal accounts of social problems. They are more receptive to slogans, blame attribution, and binary thinking, precisely the style of content that social media algorithms reward and amplify. By contrast, those with a high need for cognition are more likely to tolerate ambiguity, engage with structural explanations, even when they hold strong views.

    This helps explain why Tate’s influence does not persuade the majority, but does consistently mobilise a minority: his ideas offer emotionally satisfying, cognitively economical answers to real feelings of alienation, status anxiety, and loss of control. Social media does not create these dispositions, but it accelerates their formation and hardens them through repetition, affirmation, and isolation within digital echo chambers.

    From this perspective, a simple ban on social media for young people is best understood as a starting point rather than a solution. It may reduce exposure during formative years, particularly for those most vulnerable to simplistic and exclusionary worldviews. But it also forces a more difficult question: if harmful ideas flourish because they are easy, emotionally resonant, and constantly reinforced, then countering them requires investment elsewhere. That means building environments (educational, cultural, and civic) that enrich young people cognitively, rather than merely restricting them technologically. It means fostering critical thinking, media literacy, and social belonging that does not rely on grievance or domination.

    The risk posed by Andrew Tate’s supporters is not that they form a majority, nor that they will inevitably coalesce into organised extremism. It is that a digitally amplified minority can normalise exclusionary ideas, seed broader populist movements, and shape political discourse before institutions are ready to respond. Responsibility therefore lies less with individual users than with the platforms that design, reward, and monetise these dynamics. A social media ban may not solve the problem, but it signals a shift in seriousness. As long as outrage, grievance, and extremism remain profitable, platforms will continue to host them. Regulation is not about silencing speech, but about forcing accountability where market incentives have consistently failed.

  • What the Opportunity Index Reveals About London’s Real Advantage

    What the Opportunity Index Reveals About London’s Real Advantage

    The Sutton Trust’s Opportunity Index 2025 places London in a category of its own. The capital occupies the overwhelming majority of the highest-ranked constituencies for social mobility, even when levels of deprivation are taken into account. At first glance, this seems to confirm a familiar story. London has stronger schools, better labour markets, more universities, and greater institutional capacity. All of these factors matter. Yet they do not fully explain why London performs so exceptionally when disadvantage is measured using Free School Meal eligibility, the core indicator underpinning the Opportunity Index.

    To understand London’s apparent advantage, it is necessary to look beyond outcomes alone and examine how disadvantage is identified, recorded, and acted upon.

    London’s educational context

    London’s improvement in educational performance is well documented. The London Challenge, launched in the early 2000s, marked a decisive shift in how schools were supported and held accountable. Investment in leadership development, collaboration between schools, and targeted intervention in underperforming areas contributed to rapid improvements in attainment, particularly at secondary level. By the end of the programme, London had moved from being one of the weakest regions educationally to one of the strongest.

    The capital has also benefited from its ability to attract teaching talent. Higher wages, career opportunities, and the concentration of training programmes such as Teach First have helped channel early-career teachers into disadvantaged schools. London’s dense transport network and school choice landscape further widen access to high-performing institutions and post-16 pathways.

    Demographic change has played a role as well. Gentrification has altered school intakes in many boroughs, while immigration has increased diversity. However, research consistently shows that London’s advantage persists even when controlling for ethnicity and background. White pupils in London also outperform their peers elsewhere, indicating that demographics alone cannot explain the scale of the gap.

    The London effect as context dependent

    To establish that London’s stronger outcomes for disadvantaged pupils are not simply a statistical artefact of population composition, it is necessary to look at the literature on the so-called London effect. A major literature review by Macdougall and Lupton (2018) synthesises evidence showing that London’s comparative advantage cannot be explained by demographic composition alone. Instead, the review identifies institutional factors, including school improvement programmes, patterns of resource allocation, and local authority leadership, as central to understanding London’s performance.

    Importantly, the authors frame the London effect as context dependent rather than merely demographic. This means that pupils from similar backgrounds tend to achieve better outcomes in London because of the institutional and policy environment in which they are educated, not simply because of who they are. The relevance of this finding is not that London has eliminated disadvantage or reduced structural barriers, but that place-based systems shape how disadvantage is addressed and translated into outcomes.

    Free School Meals as an administrative measure

    The Opportunity Index measures social mobility using outcomes for pupils who were eligible for Free School Meals at age 16. FSM is a widely used proxy for disadvantage and remains essential for identifying pupils who require additional support. However, FSM is not a direct measure of poverty. It is an administrative status shaped by eligibility thresholds, registration processes, and institutional practice.

    Research from the Education Policy Institute and the Nuffield Foundation shows that eligibility for Free School Meals and the likelihood of being registered vary substantially by place and over time. This means that children with similar levels of underlying poverty are not equally likely to be recorded as FSM eligible in different regions. Yet in analyses of social mobility, FSM status is often treated as a fixed and comparable marker of disadvantage. When registration depends on local administrative practices and institutional capacity, this assumption breaks down. As a result, comparisons of outcomes between FSM pupils across regions risk conflating differences in opportunity with differences in how disadvantage is identified and recorded.

    How FSM operates differently in London

    In London, FSM administration is routinised. Schools deal with large FSM cohorts and have established processes for identifying eligible pupils. Local authorities are more likely to conduct periodic eligibility checks and support schools in registering families. Interaction with public institutions is common across income groups, making registration a routine administrative step rather than an exceptional act.

    By contrast, in many non-London areas, FSM registration relies more heavily on parents initiating applications and navigating systems themselves. Schools often work with smaller FSM populations and have less administrative capacity dedicated to entitlement identification. In these contexts, FSM status is more likely to capture a narrower group of pupils experiencing persistent disadvantage.

    This difference does not imply that London is less deprived. London has high child poverty rates. Instead, it suggests that FSM registration reflects different mixes of circumstances across places, shaped by income volatility, residential mobility, and administrative practice.

    Universal provision and reduced friction

    Recent policy decisions have further altered how FSM functions in London. Since 2023, all state primary school pupils in London have been offered free school meals through mayoral funding. This universal provision does not remove the need for means-tested FSM registration for funding purposes, but it decouples meal access from eligibility.

    As a result, schools can encourage registration by framing it as a mechanism to secure resources rather than a condition for receiving food. This reduces stigma and administrative burden, while allowing local authorities to identify eligible pupils more effectively. The consequence is both substantive and methodological. More children receive support, and FSM data more accurately reflects the population entitled to additional resources.

    What London’s advantage really shows

    London’s position at the top of the Opportunity Index does reflect genuine strengths in schooling, labour markets, and institutional capacity. But it also reflects something more fundamental. London is better at finding disadvantage and acting on it.

    FSM remains an essential indicator. Without it, disadvantage becomes invisible to policy. But the London case shows that how FSM is administered shapes who is counted, who receives support, and how opportunity is ultimately measured.

    If London’s success tells us anything, it is that social mobility begins with identification. Reducing administrative friction, routinising support, and separating help from stigma do not just improve lives. They also change what our data shows us about who is being left behind.

    In that sense, London’s real advantage is not that it has solved disadvantage, but that it has built systems that are better at seeing it.

    L Shiels

  • Polling Paradox: Reform’s Lead, Leadership Distrust, and the Search for Credible Change

    Polling Paradox: Reform’s Lead, Leadership Distrust, and the Search for Credible Change

    Recent polling highlights a defining paradox of the current British political moment. In Ipsos’s Headline Voting Intention, November 2025, Reform UK leads national vote share on 33 per cent, roughly 25 points ahead of Labour. Yet in the same month’s Satisfaction with Leaders and the Government polling, dissatisfaction with Reform’s leader ranks among the highest recorded. High electoral support combined with deep leadership distrust reveals a volatile electorate driven more by rejection of the political status quo than by confidence in an alternative governing project.

    This paradox reflects an important shift in voter behaviour. Historically, parties such as UKIP functioned as temporary outlets for Conservative dissatisfaction, with voters often returning to the Conservatives once elections approached and governing choices narrowed. Current polling suggests this dynamic has reversed. Rather than Reform bleeding support back to the Conservatives, it is now Conservative voters who are defecting to Reform. This indicates not a fleeting protest surge but a deeper erosion of Conservative credibility as a governing party.

    This shift is best understood through dealignment rather than ideology. Conservative voters have not moved to Reform because they trust its leadership or policy coherence. Instead, they appear to have disengaged from the Conservatives as a competent vehicle for managing the economy, housing, and public services. Years of political instability and declining living standards have weakened the Conservatives’ reputation for competence. When governing credibility collapses, voters become willing to defect even to parties they view sceptically.

    Leadership dissatisfaction therefore has not constrained Reform’s polling performance because dissatisfaction has become systemic. Ipsos’s November 2025 data show low satisfaction levels across party leaders and government institutions more broadly. In this environment, leadership approval loses its traditional role as a filter. Voters increasingly prioritise expressing frustration over endorsing a trusted leader. Reform benefits from being outside government and outside the established Labour Conservative cycle, even while its leader remains unpopular.

    Importantly, this does not mean the electorate has radicalised in line with Reform’s rhetoric. Polling and voter research suggest that support for Reform is driven by a combination of cultural grievance and economic insecurity, with issues such as migration frequently interpreted through their perceived impact on living standards, housing, and public services. Reform’s appeal lies less in ideological extremism than in its willingness to articulate decline at a time when mainstream parties are perceived to minimise it.

    This dynamic creates space for alternative challengers. The Green Party occupies a notably different position in Ipsos polling. While its overall vote share remains lower, leadership dissatisfaction is comparatively low, and a substantial proportion of respondents select “don’t know” when asked to evaluate Green leadership. In a fragmented political system, uncertainty is electorally softer than rejection. Combined with a gradually expanding support base, this positions the Greens as a potential beneficiary of continued volatility, particularly if dissatisfaction with both Labour and Reform hardens.

    Reform’s relative strength lies primarily in valence politics rather than ideological positioning. Its migration narrative is consistently linked to housing shortages, pressure on public services, and declining wages. These are competence-based evaluations. When parties converge programmatically, voters prioritise who they believe understands and can manage problems rather than who best represents a traditional ideological position. Reform has been effective at owning the diagnosis of decline, even if voters remain unconvinced by its capacity to govern.

    These developments reflect broader structural changes in British politics. The traditional left right divide has weakened, and electoral behaviour increasingly resembles that of a multiparty system, even as institutional structures remain two-party dominated. Labour and the Conservatives are no longer as strongly underpinned by their historical ideologies, although those philosophical roots still shape voter perceptions. Long-standing reputation and experience now function as double-edged swords, signalling competence to some voters while tying parties to past failures for others.

    This helps explain why the Liberal Democrats continue to struggle to translate vote share into broad electoral breakthroughs. Their support is often squeezed by tactical voting under first past the post, with voters reverting to Labour or the Conservatives in marginal seats. Reform and the Greens, by contrast, have benefited from political volatility by offering clearer points of distinction, even if those distinctions do not yet amount to governing credibility.

    The unresolved question is whether any challenger can convert dissatisfaction into durable trust. Reform’s coalition is currently broad but fragile, built on rejection rather than confidence. The Greens’ appeal is softer but potentially more expandable. Until a party or leader can convincingly signal credible change, British politics is likely to remain characterised by high vote shares, high dissatisfaction, and persistent instability rather than ideological realignment.

    L Shiels

  • Trump’s National Security Strategy

    Trump’s National Security Strategy

    Trump’s National Security Strategy

    Donald Trump’s approach to foreign policy is often described as erratic or transactional. In practice, it is better understood as selective engagement: cooperative where interests align, distant where they do not, and firmly hierarchical in how the United States situates itself relative to others.

    Nowhere is this clearer than in Trump’s view of Europe. While the administration maintains formal commitments to NATO, the tone toward European partners is noticeably cool. Cooperation exists, but it is conditional. European security is treated less as a shared project and more as a responsibility Europe must increasingly shoulder itself. This outlook helps explain a simultaneous insistence on higher European defence spending and a reluctance to frame Europe as the central pillar of US global strategy.

    NATO itself remains useful, but not sacrosanct. The alliance is increasingly framed as a vehicle for burden-sharing rather than solidarity. Expansion to non-EU members fits this logic. NATO becomes a flexible security architecture rather than a civilisational bloc anchored in Europe. The emphasis is on utility rather than identity.

    Alongside this is a reassertion of the Western Hemisphere as a priority space. The administration’s thinking reflects a modernised Monroe Doctrine. The Americas are treated as a zone where US influence should be uncontested, while engagement elsewhere is more discretionary. This hemispheric focus coexists uneasily with global alliances, producing tension with partners who continue to view US leadership as universal rather than regionalised.

    Economic policy reinforces this hierarchy. In Africa, the administration has promoted a shift away from long-term aid toward trade and investment, arguing that development is better driven by private capital and market access. This marks a departure from earlier aid-centric approaches. However, it has also generated tensions, particularly where funding cuts, including reductions to HIV/AIDS programmes, have raised concerns about public health and political stability.

    China occupies a distinct category. Rather than viewing China’s growth as a shared poverty-reduction success, the administration frames it as a case of strategic exploitation. The argument is that China used access to Western markets to strengthen its state capacity and global leverage without political convergence. This view underpins calls for economic decoupling and tighter controls on supply chains.

    At the same time, the US economy remains deeply dependent on low-cost goods produced abroad, often in the very countries now criticised. Western companies themselves benefited from labour arbitrage, exchange-rate advantages, and weak labour protections. The tension between strategic rivalry and consumer dependence remains unresolved.

    Taken together, Trump’s worldview places the United States not at the centre of a community of equals, but at the apex of a differentiated system. Partners, competitors, and peripheral states are managed according to their immediate utility. Cooperation exists, but warmth is rare. The result is not isolationism, but a colder and more conditional form of engagement with the world.

    For the United Kingdom, the outlook is correspondingly more constrained. The traditional strength of the US–UK relationship has rested on institutional depth, intelligence cooperation, and shared strategic assumptions. Under Trump, those structures continue to exist, but they are no longer sufficient on their own.

    Foreign policy under this administration appears increasingly shaped by personal relationships between leaders. Trump’s evident ease in dealing with Vladimir Putin, and his broader preference for direct leader-to-leader engagement, suggests a diplomatic environment in which personal affinity carries greater weight than alliance norms or historical alignment.

    This shift introduces a degree of contingency into transatlantic relations. Outcomes become less predictable, and less anchored in policy continuity, when diplomatic confidence depends on individual rapport rather than institutional trust. For Britain, influence may hinge not on proximity to Washington as a system, but on alignment with the preferences and perceptions of the president himself.

    The implication is not a rupture, but a thinning. The US–UK relationship persists, yet operates on narrower terms, shaped less by sentiment or shared identity and more by immediate strategic utility and personal alignment at the top.

    L Shiels